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Abstract 
This article reviewed ASEAN-plus-one free trade agreements (FTAs) by describing 
the backgrounds and issues in their formations, and by examining their trade effects 
through an empirical analysis. The empirics examined the trade creation and diversion 
effects of ASEAN-plus-one FTAs by estimating the gravity trade model for the recent 
two decades between 1993 and 2013. The estimation outcomes showed that the trade 
creation effect in ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA) was much larger than those in ASEAN-
Korea FTA (AKFTA) and ASEAN-Japan FTA (AJFTA), and that the trade diversion 
effects were commonly negative in ACFTA, AKFTA and AJFTA as expected. The larger 
trade creation effect in ACFTA might come from the wider gap between the general tariff 
rate and the preferential tariff rate for ASEAN in China. 
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1. Introduction 
 
According to the list of regional trade agreements (RTAs) in force presented by the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), the total 273 RTAs in the list contain the 75 RTAs 
covering Asian economies, and the 72 RTAs out of them were in force since the 2000s.1 
In this manner, RTAs including free trade agreements (FTAs) have become acceleratingly 
prevalent since the early 2000s, in particular, in Asian area. In this context, the 
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has played a core role in forming 
FTAs. ASEAN itself initiated the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, and has 
extended its framework by adding up plus-one economies: ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA, 
effect in 2004), ASEAN-Korea FTA (AKFTA, effect in 2007), ASEAN-Japan FTA 
(AJFTA, effect in 2008), ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA, effect in 
2010), and ASEAN-India (AIFTA, effect in 2010). In addition, the comprehensive RTAs 
among ASEAN and the six countries above, named Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP), is under negotiation at present. 
This trend has also encouraged a number of studies concerning the economic impacts 
of FTAs on foreign trade. When it comes to the issues on the FTA effect on trade flows, 
the central question has been about whether FTAs have “trade creation” and/or “trade 
diversion” effects, since Jacob Viner (1950) argued on these effects for the first time. The 
trade creation occurs when joining a FTA leads to replacement of high-cost domestic 
production by imports from within the FTA members. Under this case, the trade is 
increased and/or created within member countries. The trade diversion, on the other hands, 
takes place when joining a FTA leads to replacement of cheap imports from outside the 
FTA members by more expensive imports from inside. Under this occasion, the trade is 
reduced and/or even eliminated with non-members. In practice, both trade creation and 
diversion effects take place due to the FTA formation, and which effects are dominant is 
a crucial question. 
For evaluating the trade effects of FTAs in ex post manner, a number of empirical 
studies have estimated the “gravity trade model”. Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963) 
were the first to apply the “Newton’s Law of Gravitation” to international trade flows. In 
its original form, the gravity equation explains bilateral trade flows by the economic size 
of two countries and the distance between them. Since Anderson (1979) assigned the 
model with theoretical underpinnings for the first time, the gravity trade model has been 
established as being consistent with theories of trade based upon models of imperfect 
competition and with the Heckscher-Ohlin model (see, e.g. Helpman and Krugman, 1985; 
                                                 
1 See WTO webpage: http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx. 
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and Deardorff, 1998).The model has often provided a useful tool to assess the trade-
integration effects of regional economic ties such as FTAs. The intensity of the trade-
integration caused by FTAs is usually measured by the coefficients of dummy variables, 
which are added in the gravity trade equation for the FTA partners during the FTA-in-
force period. A positive and statistically significant coefficient for the dummy shows that 
the trade flows exceed the normal level predicted by the country’s economic sizes and the 
distance between them, thereby implying an intensive trade-integration effect caused by 
the FTA. 
Looking at the empirical literature, even after forty years of gravity equation 
estimates of the effect of FTAs on trade flows, there seemed no clear and convincing 
empirical evidence, until Baier and Bergstrand (2007) presented a thorough empirical 
analysis on the FTA treatment effects. 2  They pointed out that trade policy is not 
exogenous variable, and addressed econometrically the endogeneity of FTAs: the FTA 
dummy variable is correlated with the error term. They argued that standard cross-section 
techniques using instrumental variables and control functions did not provide stable 
estimates of the FTA effects in the presence of endogeneity, and instead utilized a 
theoretically-motivated gravity equation using panel data with fixed effects. They finally 
found that, on average, an FTA approximately doubles two members’ bilateral trade after 
ten years, i.e., seven times the effect estimated using the standard cross-section techniques. 
Following the econometrical methodologies of Baier and Bergstrand (2007), Urata 
and Okabe (2014) examined the impacts of RTAs including FTAs on trade flows, with a 
particular focus on their trade creation and diversion effects. They estimated the gravity 
trade equation covering 67 countries/regions for 27 years from 1980 to 2006 at a 
disaggregated level of 20 products. Their estimation addressed the problem of the RTA-
endogeneity bias and zero trade flows by applying the panel-data analysis with fixed 
effects and the Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood model as its estimating technique. 
Their main findings were as follows: plurilateral RTAs produce trade creation for many 
more products compared with bilateral RTAs; RTAs among developed countries generate 
trade creation for a half of all products but not trade diversion for most of products, 
whereas RTAs among developing countries give rise to trade diversion for many more 
products –probably due to high tariffs imposed on imports from non-members by 
developing countries. Regarding the literature on empirical studies of ASEAN-plus-one 
FTAs, Yang and Martinez-Zarzoso (2014) estimated the effect of China-ASEAN FTA 
using gravity equation in agricultural and manufactured products with three dummies: (1) 
trade creation dummy within bloc, (2) export creation between intra- and extra-bloc, and 
                                                 
2 Baier and Bergstrand (2007) expressed the past unreliable estimates of FTA treatment effects as 
“fragile” estimates by citing Frankel (1997) and Ghosh and Yamarik (2004). 
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(3) trade diversion between intra- and extra-bloc. They found trade creation effect not 
only within ASEAN but also for China-ASEAN FTA on the whole and positive export 
creation effect on the exports of agriculture and major manufactured products. 
This article aims to examine the trade creation and diversion effects                      
of ASEAN-plus-one FTAs by estimating the gravity trade model for the recent two 
decades between 1993 and 2013. The estimation, as in Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and 
Urata and Okabe (2014), applies the panel-data with fixed effects to clear the FTA-
endogeneity problem. The main contribution of this article, which Baier and Bergstrand 
(2007) and Urata and Okabe (2014) did not cope with, is to investigate an individual trade 
effect of each of ASEAN-plus-one FTAs: ACFTA, AKFTA, AJFTA, AANZFTA and 
AIFTA, by utilizing the updated trade data towards 2013. The empirical outcomes on the 
trade effects of ASEAN-plus-one FTAs might also provide some implication for the 
ongoing negotiation of RCEP framework covering all the countries related with ASEAN-
plus-one FTAs. The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the 
backgrounds and issues in the formation of ASEAN-plus-one FTAs. Section 3 presents 
empirical analyses containing methodology, data, and estimation results. The last Section 
summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Backgrounds and Issues of ASEAN-Plus-One FTAs 
 
This section describes the backgrounds and issues in the formation of ASEAN-plus-
one FTAs as follows. 
 
2.1 Backgrounds 
ASEAN consists of ten countries. Five founding countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) signed a framework for regional economic growth 
and peace and stability in 1967, which was manifested in Bangkok Declaration. 
According to the World Bank (2000), the motivations for regional economic integration 
can be divided into political and economic perspectives. Political motivations are regional 
security, bargaining power, project cooperation, lock-in to reform and lobbying for 
integration, while economic ones are towards competition, scale economy, trade 
creation/diversion and locational effects. The motivations of ASEAN were arguably 
politics because ASEAN’s inaugural purpose was to blockade the spread of Chinese 
Communism through regional economic development. Economic cooperation was rather 
a supporting role and of a second degree importance after political one. Low economic 
dependence with each other, competitive nature of the economies and uneven economic 
development of the members continuously set the tone for weak economic cooperation 
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of ASEAN. Before mentioning ASEAN-Plus-One FTAs, brief sketch of how ASEAN has 
evolved would be helpful. 
 
2.1.1. 1st Stage Widening  
The founding five members were at economically developing stages, except 
Singapore, mainly dependent on endowed resources. Recognizing lack of political power 
due to the limited number and size, neighboring countries were encouraged to participate 
in ASEAN. Brunei Darussalam joined in 1984 followed by Viet Nam in 1996, Lao PDR 
and Myanmar in 1997, and finally Cambodia joined in 1999. The ambition for the bigger 
ASEAN was expressed in 1997 ASEAN Summit. 
 
2.1.2. Deepening 
As mentioned above, the depth and scope of economic cooperation of the ASEAN 
was rather limited and weak from the beginning. Rivalry nature of the economies of 
members constrained active engagement of the members. Members agreed to lower their 
tariffs only on less ambitious array of commodities, and the implementation was still far 
from satisfactory. To deepen mutual cooperation, AFTA in goods came into surface in 
1992. The end of the Cold War has weakened the political zeal for regional solidarity, 
while the economic recession in the region during 1980s gathered strong push for 
furthering the economic cooperation. 
External factors expedited the economic cooperation of ASEAN: (1) the Plaza 
Accord made Japanese firms invest actively in the ASEAN, and accordingly the Japanese 
firms wanted free movements of resources and goods across ASEAN member countries, 
(2) the rise of China also rendered more serious economic cooperation. 
In 2007 Cebu Declaration, ASEAN set the goal for the ASEAN Economic 
Community by 2016, similar to European Community in some sense, to embrace for the 
diversity and to go far beyond simple political and economic cooperation. 
 
2.1.3 2nd Stage Widening (ASEAN-Plus-One) 
Among much literature on the backgrounds for AEAN-Plus-One, Kleimann (2013) 
and Estrada et al. (2014) are comprehensive. Recognizing the ineffectiveness of the 
ASEAN short of capitalizing on economic scales and opportunities and of exercising 
political powers, ASEAN stepped forward to expand the realm of economic cooperation 
beyond ASEAN. 
The contagion effect during the Asian financial crisis rendered the separation of 
Northeast Asia from Southeast Asia blurred, which made the countries of ASEAN and 
non-ASEAN widen their cooperation to embrace each other. Sluggish movement of 
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multilateral trade negotiations, notably the WTO, and the fear against imminent creation 
of the blocs in Europe and America, pressured further for the economic cooperation of 
wider region (Estrada et al. 2014). Being historical and natural trading partners, Japan, 
Korea, China, Australia, New Zealand and India were the partners to conclude economic 
cooperation agreement with ASEAN. Chinese early harvest FTA with ASEAN took effect 
in 2004, Japan did in 2008, Korea did in 2007 and India and Australia-New Zealand did 
in 2010. According to the ASEAN Secretariat, as of 2013, ASEAN is the 7th largest 
economy in the world with a combined GDP of USD 2.4 trillion and with 625 million 
population. 
 
2.2 Issues of ASEAN-Plus-One FTAs 
 
2.2.1 Politically motivated FTA 
Political motivation together with economic one played a role in ASEAN-Plus-One 
FTAs. Japan expanded huge foreign direct investment in ASEAN in reaction to the 
appreciation of Japanese yen after the Plaza Accord. As a result, deep and wide Japanese 
production network sprawled out in ASEAN area. China was antsy about Japanese 
stronghold in ASEAN, which has historical ties with China. Against this background, 
China came into an action to conclude FTA. Japan reacted to China with its own FTA 
with ASEAN and Korea also joined the race. 
 
2.2.2 No deep market access 
The political motivation behind ASEAN-Plus-One FTA limited the level of the 
market access, the most important part of integration agreements. Some country 
specificities also determined the degree of FTAs. With ten diverse members, ASEAN is 
not in position to drive proactive opening policy. China did not prefer tight binding with 
foreign countries and India was cautious and not ready to open wide externally, too 
(Kleimann, 2013). ASEAN did not feel comfortable with huge China and India. Japanese 
and Korea FTAs with ASEAN are also basically circumscribed by plurilateral political 
setting of ASEAN. 
 
2.2.3 Limited scope of coverage 
Plurilateral heterogeneity resulted in a rather smaller range of cooperative areas. 
Smaller areas of WTO-plus and WTO-extra were included in ASEAN-Plus-One FTAs 
than world average (Kleimann, 2013). The narrow common denominator of ASEAN 
members regarding the concession led to the shallow opening of the market. 
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2.2.4 Low trade intensity 
During 2000-2011, AEAN total trade in 2011 increased 3.1 times compared with 
trade in 2000, which is equivalent to an annual growth rate of 11.0%. Intra-ASEAN trade 
in 2011 increased 3.5 times compared with year 2000, which is 12.1% growth rate per 
annum during the same period, which is larger than the annual growth rate of extra-
ASEAN trade (3.0 times and 10.6% annual growth) (See Table 2). The share of intra-
ASEAN trade in overall ASEAN trade has increased from 22.0% in 2000 to 24.5% in 
2013, while the share of extra-ASEAN trade has decreased from 78.0% to 75.5% during 
the same period. Increase in import is larger than increase in exports, and intra-ASEAN 
imports are greater than extra imports. 
Even if the internal trade seems to increase relatively higher, the share of internal 
trade is less than thirty percent, which is small compared with EU, NAFTA and other 
FTAs. 
 
2.2.5. ASEAN and ASEAN-Plus-One-FTAs are trade diverting? 
From simple statistics in Table 1, ASEAN seems to have diverted trade from extra-
ASEAN to intra-ASEAN. Considering the growing nature of ASEAN, the trade diversion 
effect seems to reinforce itself. It needs a lot of capital goods, parts and components 
imported from extra-ASEAN, which means ASEAN is inherently not prone to divert 
trade, more specifically import diversion. 
Three more points as follows add to less-likely trade diversion effect of ASEAN. 
First, ASEAN must import the necessities, notably raw materials. ASEAN’s trade at the 
product level reveals high dependency on certain sources. In 2013, ASEAN Secretariat 
emphasized ASEAN’s high import dependency on certain countries. For example, 
Australia and New Zealand are major import source for meat and wool and India supplies 
peanut oilcake. The high dependency of ASEAN on extra ASEAN in certain areas must 
maintain the extra ASEAN imports, at least hinder trade diversion from extra- to intra-
ASEAN. Second, ASEAN is an active host of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Table 2 
shows that it receives FDI from extra-ASEAN as almost six times as much from intra-
ASEAN. Even though FDI from intra-ASEAN has been on the increase, the magnitude 
of it pales that of extra-ASEAN. Manufacturing sector has been a prime recipient of FDI 
and financial area and mining follows. Third, income growth may have induced imports 
from external sources. In order to figure trade creation and trade diversion effect, we need 
to take the wealth effect into account. 
By considering the issues above and with the best available data, the next section will 
statistically examine the trade creation and diversion effects of ASEAN-plus-one FTAs 
by estimating the gravity trade model. 
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3. Empirics on Trade Effects of ASEAN-Plus-One FTAs 
 
This section focuses on the empirical analysis of the trade creation and diversion 
effects of ASEAN-plus-one FTAs by estimating the gravity trade model. We first clarify 
the methodology and data, and then represent the estimation outcomes and discuss them. 
 
3.1 Methodology 
We herein adopt a theoretically-motivated gravity trade model using panel data with 
bilateral fixed effects and multilateral time-varying price resistance terms. The equation 
for estimation is specified as follows. 
 
ln[𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡)⁄ ] = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑇𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼4𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the value of the merchandise trade flow from exporter i to importer j, 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡) is the level of nominal gross domestic product in country i (j), 𝐷𝑖𝑗 is a 
bilateral dummy variable between i and j, 𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a bilateral real exchange rate in the 
logarithm, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is an error term. We also insert the time dummy from 1993 to 2013. 
Regarding the FTA effects on trade flows, the equation includes two kinds of dummy 
variables as in Urata and Okabe (2014). 𝐹𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡, a variable for denoting trade creation 
effect, takes a value 1 if both importer and exporter belong to the same FTA and 0 
otherwise, and 𝐹𝑇𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡, a variable for denoting trade diversion effect, takes a value 1 if 
the importer is a member of the FTA, but the exporter is not and 0 otherwise, respectively. 
From the concept of trade creation and diversion effects we described in the introduction, 
the sign of the coefficient, 𝛼1, is expected to be positive, while 𝛼2 is expected to be 
negative. 
To address the FTA-endogeneity bias, the equation includes a bilateral dummy 
variable between i and j, 𝐷𝑖𝑗. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) argued that the FTA is not 
exogenous variable but is influenced by considerable unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity among country pairs such as policy-related barriers (that also affects trade 
volume), and that this omitted variable bias is the major source of endogeneity facing 
estimation of FTA effects in gravity equations using cross-section data. They examined 
the validity of cross-section techniques using instrumental variables and control functions, 
but concluded that these techniques were not reliable enough to provide stable estimates 
of the FTA effects, and that the unobserved time-invariant bilateral variables were best 
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controlled by using bilateral “fixed effects” in the gravity equation using panel data.3 
There would be another potential endogeneity bias created by simultaneity: GDP is a 
function of net exports. Although the simultaneity bias is considered to be not so large in 
the literature, the specification above has GDPs on the left hand side.4 
The specification includes a bilateral real exchange rate, 𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡, to account for the 
theoretically-motivated multilateral time-varying price resistance terms. The gravity trade 
model suggested by recent formal theoretical developments requires the multilateral price 
variables. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) suggested the use of country-specific fixed 
effects as the method for accounting for multilateral price terms in cross section. In a 
panel setting, however, the multilateral price terms would be time-varying. One way to 
control for price changes is to introduce, similarly to Rose (2000) and Vandenbussche and 
Zanardi (2010), the bilateral real exchange rate that varies over time and tracks price 
changes, the coefficient of which is expected to have a negative sign.  
We introduce lagged effects of FTAs on trade, since FTA is in general “phased-in” 
for some years and terms-of-trade changes caused by FTA also tend to have lagged effects 
on trade. Although Baier and Bergstrand (2007) supposed around a ten-year lagged period, 
we include lagged effects by three years, since all the ASEAN-plus-one FTAs were just 
in force within these ten years. ACFTA was in force in January 2004 and thus its dummy 
takes value 1 from 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007, AKFTA in force in June 2007 and its 
value 1 from 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, and AJFTA in force in December 2008 and its 
value 1 from 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. AANEFTA and AIFTA came into force very 
recently, in January 2010, and their dummies take value 1 only from 2010 with no lags. 
Some of the studies on gravity trade model encounter the treatment of zero trade flow 
values, as Urata and Okabe (2014) applied the Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood model 
to cope with it. This study, however, deals with total values of trade flows of selected 
major countries, which do not include zero values. 
 
3.2 Data 
The sample period is from 1993 to 2013. The reason why we choose 1993 as its 
starting year is that the FTA within ASEAN named AFTA was in force in January 1992, 
and so after this we can concentrate only on the effects of ASEAN-plus-one FTAs. 
The sample covers 14 countries/regions: Australia, China, E.U. (28 countries), India, 
                                                 
3 Baier and Bergstrand (2007) conducted the estimation using first-differenced data as well as fixed 
effects for robustness analysis, and found no significant differences in the estimation outcomes. Thus 
we herein only focus on the fixed-effect estimation.  
4 Scaling the left-hand-side trade flow by product of GDPs means imposing the restriction of unitary 
income elasticities. Baier and Bergstrand (2007), however, showed that imposing the unitary income 
elasticities had no impact on the FTA coefficient estimate. 
10 
 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, U.S., 
and the rest of the world (RW). Regarding ASEAN, we focus on four countries above 
(ASEAN4), since the latecomers such as Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam 
have their different schedules of tariff reduction in AFTA.5 Table 3 summarizes the trade 
flows in the sample countries/regions in 2013. It shows that the exports of China, Korea, 
Japan and ASEAN4 to the sample countries/regions except RW occupy more than sixty 
percent of their exports to the world. Figure 1 describes the trends in the trade flows 
between ASEAN4 and China, Korea and Japan. It represents rapid two-way trade growth 
between them, in particular, in China, except in the crisis periods of 1997-98 and 2009. 
We then construct panel data for the period between 1993 and 2013 with 14 
countries/regions. The trade data are retrieved from RIETI-TID 2013, the database 
produced by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) in Japan.6 
The GDP and the data for calculating a bilateral real exchange rate, i.e. consumer prices 
and bilateral nominal exchange rates, are from World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Database, April 2015, by the International Monetary Fund. 
 
3.3 Estimation Outcomes and Discussion 
Table 4 reports the estimation outcomes of the gravity trade model on the trade 
creation and diversion effects of ASEAN-plus-one FTAs. The main points we observe 
here are as follows. First, the cumulative coefficients of the FTAC and FTAD dummy 
variables have expected signs except the cases of trade diversion in the three-lagged 
AKFTA and of trade creation in AANZFTA and AIFTA: the trade creation effects are 
significantly positive on trade flows while the trade diversion effects are significantly 
negative on them. Second, much difference lies in the trade creation effects between in 
ACFTA and in AKFTA and AJFTA. The trade creation effect in ACFTA, around 0.3, is 
much larger than those in AKFTA (around 0.1) and AJFTA (less than 0.1). The coefficient, 
0.3, suggests that the effect of the presence of a free trade agreement is to increase trade 
by 35 percent between the country pairs (𝑒0.3 = 1.35). This estimated outcome is also 
consistent with the previous study of ACFTA trade effects, Yang and Martinez-Zarzoso 
(2014). Third, trade diversion effects are around -0.05 in ACFTA, AKFTA and AJFTA 
except the three-lagged AKFTA. Lastly, the coefficient of the bilateral exchange rate is 
significantly negative as expected in each case. 
We interpret the estimation outcomes above in the following ways. Regarding the 
difference in the trade creation effects between in ACFTA and in AKFTA and AJFTA, we 
infer the following possible reasons. First, the wider gap between the general tariff rate 
                                                 
5 We also exclude Singapore Brunei due to transit-trading and oil producing country, respectively.  
6 See http://www.rieti-tid.com/. 
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and the preferential tariff rate for ASEAN in China might create the larger trade creation 
effect in ACFTA. Since the tariffs in ASEAN seem to be common for China, Korea and 
Japan under ACFTA, AKFTA and AJFTA, the comparison of tariff levels should be made 
in the side of China, Korea and Japan. The general tariff rates can typically be indicated 
by “Most Favored Nation (MFN) duty rate”. According to the tariff database by World 
Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS),7 in 2011, for instance, the average MFN duty rate in 
China is 11.98 percent and that in Japan is 7.71 percent. On the other hand, the average 
preferential tariff rate for ASEAN in China under ACFTA is 0.13 percent and that in Japan 
under AJFTA is 1.32 percent.8 Thus, the wider gap in China between general tariff rate, 
11.98, and preferential rate, 0.13, compared with that in Japan, might give the greater 
incentive for ASEAN to export more to China, thereby causing “more trade creation” 
under ACFTA. It should be also noted that the average level of preferential tariff for 
ASEAN in China under ACFTA, 0.13, is lower than that in Japan under AJFTA, 1.32, 
and that the coverage of the products applied for ACFTA in China is also wider than that 
for AJFTA in Japan.9 When we compare the preferential tariff rates for ASEAN under 
ACFTA and AJFTA by common traded items, the tariff rates under ACFTA are lower than 
those under AJFTA in all the items, as shown in Table 5. In this situation, the trade 
creation effect in AJFTA might be offset by more robust one in ACFTA. This situation 
might be in line with the argument of Fugazza and Nicita (2013): some countries see part 
of the trade effects provided by improvements in “direct” market access conditions eroded 
by the deterioration in their “relative” market access conditions. Another background for 
less trade creation effect in AJFTA is that the bilateral FTAs such as those between Japan 
and Malaysia and between Japan and Thailand were in force in July 2006 and in 
November in 2007, respectively, before the enforcement of AJFTA, so that some of the 
trade creation effect of AJFTA could be absorbed ahead by those of bilateral FTAs. 
As for the trade diversion effects, the negative impacts of ACFTA should be larger 
since ACFTA in the presence of the “higher” general tariff rate in China might usually 
produce “more” of trade diversion. The estimated effect of ACFTA is, however, not so 
large compared with those of AKFTA and AJFTA. One of the speculations is that the 
imports of China depend more on primary goods than those of Korea and Japan10, and 
also that the coverage of the products imported from least developed countries with zero-
                                                 
7 See https://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/Restricted/Login.aspx. 
8 The preferential tariff rate for ASEAN in Korea under AKFTA is not disclosed in the database. 
9 The number of product codes applied for ACFTA in China is 6,673, while that applied for AJFTA in 
Japan is 4,312, in 2011, according to WITS database. 
10 The share of primary goods in total imports in 2013 is 33.6 percent in China, 29.6 in Korea and 
29.1 in Japan, respectively, according to RIETI-TID 2013.  
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tariff in China is wider than that in Japan.11 The primary goods imported from developing 
countries might be insensitive to tariff rates and/or might be under preferential treatment. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
This article examined the trade creation and diversion effects of ASEAN-plus-one 
FTAs by estimating the gravity trade model for the recent two decades between 1993 and 
2013. The estimation applied the panel-data with fixed effects to clear the FTA-
endogeneity problem. The empirics showed that the trade creation effect in ACFTA was 
much larger than those in AKFTA and AJFTA, and that the trade diversion effects were 
commonly negative in ACFTA, AKFTA and AJFTA as expected. The larger trade creation 
effect in ACFTA might come from the wider gap between the general tariff rate and the 
preferential tariff rate for ASEAN in China. 
The implication of the empirics above is that the formation of RCEP is one of the 
desirable directions to maximize trade creation effect and minimize trade diversion effect. 
Since the RCEP has a function to merge all the individual ASEAN-plus-one FTAs, it will 
reduce trade diversion effect at least among plus-one countries such as China, Korea and 
Japan, and will expand trade creation effect if the preferential tariff rates are unified to 
the lowest level. 
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Table 1 ASEAN Trade Flow (2000-2011, Billion U.S. dollars) 
 
Source: ASEAN Homepage, compiled by the authors 
 
 
Table 2 FDI Flows from Extra-ASEAN (Million U.S. dollars)
Source: ASEAN Homepage, compiled by the authors 
 
 2000 2005 2010 2011 2011/ 
2000 
Annual  
Growth (%) 
ASEAN Total Trade 759.1 1224.9 1998.2 2386.6 3.1 11.0 
ASEAN Total Exports 410.2 648.2 1,051.1 1,237.8 3.0 10.6 
ASEAN Total Imports 349.0 567.7 950.0 1,148.9 3.3 11.4 
Intra ASEAN Trade 166.8 304.9 548.4 584.3 3.5 12.1 
Intra ASEAN Exports 93.4 163.9 295.4 309.7 3.3 11.5 
Intra ASEAN Imports 73.5 141 253 274.6 3.7 12.7 
Extra ASEAN Trade 592.3 920 1449.7 1802.3 3.0 10.6 
Extra ASEAN Exports 316.8 484.3 752.7 928.1 2.9 10.3 
Extra ASEAN Imports 275.5 435.7 697.0 874.3 3.2 11.1 
 
Table 2 - FDI Flows from Extra-ASEAN (US$ millions) 
 2000 2005 2007 2009 2010 2010/ 
2000 
Annual 
Growth 
Intra ASEAN  762 4,060 9,626 5,271 12,279  16.1 32% 
FDI from Extra  22,779 36,654 66,025 32,995 63,929  2.8 10.9% 
  By Sector      Sum (05-10) Share 
Agro, Fishery 
and Forestry 
 156 454 -38 92 1058  0.4  
Mining and 
Quarrying 
 2,935 4,135 4,426 3,953 21209  7.4  
Manufacturing  13,659 20,387 17,633 17,656 94863  33.2  
Construction  17 305 519 470 1912  0.7  
Financial   5,713 12,682 4,755 15,083 58600  20.5  
Real Estate  850 6,805 3,668 9,329 26825  9.4  
Others  12,215 19,687 1,405 15,986 74060  25.9  
Unspecified  1,123 1,563 597 1,299 7390  2.6  
TOTAL  36,666 66,016 32,966 63,867  285913  100.0  
 
15 
 
 
Table 3 Summary of Trade Flows in Sample Countries/Regions in 2013 
 
Source: RIETI-TID2013 
 
Billion U.S. dollars
Exporter
Importer
China 171.5 156.9 145.1
Korea 79.3 59.1 32.5
Japan 169.8 34.0 86.3
ASEAN 4 106.0 35.2 81.5
Taiwan 41.9 15.6 42.9 21.1
U.S. 421.2 62.1 133.4 74.4
EU(28) 384.8 55.1 85.2 77.5
Australia 42.0 9.4 17.5 25.3
New Zealand 6.3 1.6 2.5 3.7
India 46.1 11.6 10.1 29.6
World 2,047.0 546.3 762.5 772.5
                    % of exports to the world
Exporter
Importer
China 31.4 20.6 18.8
Korea 3.9 7.7 4.2
Japan 8.3 6.2 11.2
ASEAN 4 5.2 6.4 10.7
Taiwan 2.0 2.9 5.6 2.7
U.S. 20.6 11.4 17.5 9.6
EU(28) 18.8 10.1 11.2 10.0
Australia 2.0 1.7 2.3 3.3
New Zealand 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5
India 2.3 2.1 1.3 3.8
Total /World 63.4 72.5 77.3 64.1
China Korea Japan ASEAN 4
China Korea Japan ASEAN 4
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Figure 1 Trends in Trade Flows between ASEAN4 and Plus-One Countries 
 
Source: RIETI-TID2013 
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Table 4 Estimation Outcomes on Trade Effects of ASEAN-Plus-One FTAs 
 
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses. **, ***, denotes statistical significance at 5, and 1 percent 
level. “Total” is sum of the statistically-significant FTA coefficient estimates.  
Source: RIETI-TID2013, and WEO database, April 2015.  
  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
ACFTA: Trade Creation
  FTA 0.34*** (3.25) 0.63*** (8.15) 0.63*** (8.14) 0.63*** (8.14)
  FTA-1 -0.32*** (-4.74) 0.01*** (81.26) 0.01*** (80.90)
  FTA-2 -0.38** (-6.18) -0.11*** (-80.55)
  FTA-3 -0.29*** (-4.78)
  Total 0.33 0.31 0.26 0.24
ACFTA: Trade Diversion
  FTA -0.04 (-1.58) 0.04*** (3.15) 0.04*** (3.14) 0.04 ** (3.08)
  FTA-1 -0.10*** (-4.88) -0.09*** (-118.75) -0.09*** (-118.27)
  FTA-2 0.00 (0.01) -0.05*** (-10.11)
  FTA-3 0.07** (2.49)
  Total - -0.06 -0.05 -0.03
AKFTA: Trade Creation
  FTA 0.03 (0.43) -0.26*** (-6.10) -0.26*** (-6.04) -0.27*** (-6.47)
  FTA-1 0.35*** (8.56) 0.22*** (720.18) 0.22*** (717.15)
  FTA-2 0.16*** (4.97) 0.21*** (31.71)
  FTA-3 -0.05 (-1.59)
  Total - 0.09 0.12 0.16
AKFTA: Trade Diversion
  FTA -0.02 (-0.64) 0.04*** (3.15) 0.04*** (3.14) -0.17*** (-6.23)
  FTA-1 -0.10*** (-4.88) -0.09*** (-118.75) 0.10*** (88.99)
  FTA-2 0.00 (0.01) 0.14*** (13.97)
  FTA-3 -0.02** (-0.69)
  Total - -0.06 -0.05 0.05
AJFTA: Trade Creation
  FTA 0.02 (0.46) -0.10*** (-4.90) -0.12*** (-5.64) -0.14*** (-7.16)
  FTA-1 0.14*** (4.94) 0.12*** (9.53) 0.13*** (10.56)
  FTA-2 0.02 (0.64) -0.04*** (-352.38)
  FTA-3 0.11*** (2.79)
  Total - 0.04 0.00 0.06
AJFTA: Trade Diversion
  FTA -0.06 (-1.57) -0.17*** (-5.68) -0.20*** (-7.52) -0.22*** (-14.14)
  FTA-1 0.11*** (5.52) 0.07*** (3.70) 0.09*** (6.12)
  FTA-2 0.04* (1.73) -0.00*** (-18.07)
  FTA-3 0.08*** (3.96)
  Total - -0.06 -0.09 -0.05
AANZFTA+AIFTA: Trade Creation
  FTA -0.12*** (-3.30) -0.14*** (-3.81) -0.15*** (-3.98) -0.15*** (-4.07)
AANZFTA+AIFTA: Trade Diversion
  FTA -0.10** (-2.14) -0.12*** (-2.65) -0.13*** (-2.75) -0.12*** (-2.66)
REX -0.17*** (-3.55) -0.17*** (-3.71) -0.17*** (-3.72) -0.17*** (-3.69)
Constant -17.86*** (-79.28) -17.84*** (-80.32) -17.83*** (80.26) -17.84*** (79.90)
Adjusted R*R 0.8449 0.8451 0.8452 0.8451
No. Observation 3,780 3,780 3,780 3,780
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Table 5 Comparison in Tariff Rate for ASEAN under ACFTA and AJFTA  
 
 
HS 6 digits China under ACFTA Japan under AJFTA
702000 Articles of glass > Other articles of glass 0 1.9
710210 Diamonds > Diamonds Unsorted 0 5.4
711510 Other articles of precious metal > Catalysts in the form of wire cloth etc 0 5.7
902300 Instruments, apparatus and models, designed for demonstrational purposes 0 7.6 - 12.7
HS 4 digits
7101 Pearls, not strung, mounted or set etc 0 5.4
7103 Precious stones and semi-precious stones etc 0 2
7104 Synthetic or reconstructed precious or semi-precious stones etc 0 6.7
7109 Base metals or silver, clad with gold etc 0 2 - 6.7
7114 Articles of goldsmiths' or silversmiths' wares & parts etc 5 5.7
8101 Tungsten ( wolfram ) and articles thereof, incl. waste and scrap 0 3.8
8105 Cobalt mattes & other intermediate products of cobalt metallurgy etc 0 4.1
8109 Zirconium and articles thereof, incl. waste and scrap 0 0 - 2
8111 Manganese and articles thereof, incl. waste and scrap 0 6.1 - 7.6
9021 Orthopaedic appliances; splints & other fracture appliances etc 0 12.7
9022 Apparatus based on the use of X-rays etc 0 12.7
9024 Machines & appliances for testing the hardness, strength, etc 0 0 - 12.7
9031 Other measuring or checking instruments, appliances & machines etc 0 7.6
9101 Wrist-watches, pocket-watches & other watches etc 0 0 - 4.5
9109 Clock movements, complete and assembled 0 0 - 3.6
